The Philosophical Case for Extinction of the Personality at Death

Keith Augustine

Immortality has primarily been an issue discussed among philosophers. Thus, in analyzing the case for permanent extinction of the personality at death, it is convenient to address the philosophical arguments before looking at the scientific evidence for annihilation. Logical arguments, if valid, are decisive; thus, not even an appeal to faith could vindicate a belief that is incoherent because no one would understand what it is that he claims to believe. The extinction hypothesis is supported by the conceptual problems that plague the notions of disembodied minds, astral bodies, and resurrection. When considering the logical arguments for annihilation, the burden of proof falls on the extinction hypothesis because the purpose of these arguments is to prove that our personalities must permanently cease to exist at death.

The proponent who contends that annihilation (or survival) must be true must present a prima-facie case to support that contention. Survival in the form of disembodied minds contends that people possess an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes the personality. One objection to this view, that human beings are essentially corporeal, is stated by Corliss Lamont:

If we carefully examine their accounts, we find that... they actually provide this spirit with a body... their descriptions give to it activities, functions, and environments usually pertaining to earthly existence and natural bodies. The immortal personality... enjoys and suffers a great many experiences that would simply be impossible without the cooperation of... the body (Lamont 46).

Gardner Murphy illustrates this point when he asks us "to try... to imagine what his personal existence would be like if he were deprived of every device for making contact with his environment" (Edwards 46). Antony Flew gives an excellent example of our corporeal nature:

Consider... how you would teach the meaning of any person word to a child. This is done... by some sort of direct or indirect pointing at members of that very special class of living physical objects to which we one and all belong (Flew 111).

Thus, to quote John Hospers, "Your body seems to be involved in every activity we try to describe even though we have tried to imagine existing without it" (Hospers 280).

This brings up an interesting point. Even if you conceded the possibility of disembodied existence, you would still have to justify the identification of the disembodied spirit with the previously "flesh and blood" person. C. D. Broad makes the point:

If I cannot clearly conceive what it would be like to be an unembodied person, I find it almost incredible that the experiences of such a person... could be sufficiently continuous with those had in his lifetime by any deceased human being as to constitute together the experiences of one and the same person (Broad 278).

Many philosophers have argued the bodily continuity is more essential to personal identity than memory because memory claims can be real or false; thus memory in itself is not enough to make you the same person over time--bodily continuity is required (Edwards 48-9).

Another problem for disembodied minds is called the problem of individuation. Basically, the problem is: How do we distinguish mind A from mind B? The answer is spatial location of their bodies (Edwards 49). It is inconceivable how two minds could be distinguished otherwise, especially if we add the further condition that these minds be identical in thought content, which is logically possible.

This brings us to the notion of astral bodies. What astral body theories attempt to do is "portray an immortality in terms of a visual image of the body that is entirely dissociated from the tactile image, to preserve the form of the earthly body without its solidity" (Lamont 48). This is the type of immortality most people envision. This view tends to reinforce the argument that humans are essentially corporeal by defining astral bodies by relation to physical bodies:

Does not this view... avoid the dilemma we have been describing? It does, but only to confirm quite clearly our central argument. For as soon as our death-conquering spirit becomes itself a material thing, it then and there receives a body... Thus the essential unity of the body-personality is again demonstrated (Lamont 49).

Flew states the problem as thus: "It is, obviously, to find some positive characterisation for an astral body" (Flew 117). That is, if we are to begin to take the notion of astral bodies seriously, we are going to need some positive criteria for what it is to be an astral body rather than a contrast between it and disembodied minds or normal physical bodies. One absurdity for astral body theories is that astral bodies would require astral clothes, not to mention an entire astral plane, which quite conveniently appears and functions exactly like the physical world.

Another problem for astral body theories is the problem of synchronization. The astral body is supposed to be an exact duplicate of the physical body (Edwards 21). Thus, for every physical action there is a corresponding astral action (Edwards 22). As Paul Edwards points out, "all events in a person's life [involve] physical contact... [but] the astral body cannot touch or be touched by another body" (Edwards 22). Edwards puts the last nail in the coffin for a version of astral body theories when he observes that

If the astral body is an exact duplicate of the regular body it must die along with the regular body... If the secular body died as the result of a brain tumor or as the result of being shot through the heart, the astral brain and astral heart must have been similarly injured (Edwards 22).

There are no conceptual difficulties, however, with a modified theory of astral bodies. It is not necessary for astral bodies to mirror physical bodies exactly; the minimum required characterization for astral bodies is that they have some physical characteristics such as shape, size, and spatial position. A minimum characterization, however, hardly provides a plausible account. A specific positive characterization is required for a credible theory. What form of exotic matter is the astral body constituted of? Why does the astral body remain undetected? How does the astral body function?

Finally we are brought to resurrection. Literal resurrection of the decayed corpse faces a single insuperable difficulty: How are the constituent parts of a long-decayed corpse that have been absorbed into other human beings going to be reconstituted along with the other people who share the same matter? Cannibalism poses the same problem.

The other form of resurrection invokes the creation of a new body that is not materially continuous with the old. Flew immediately objects: "Thus to produce even the most indistinguishably similar object after the first one has been totally destroyed and disappeared is to produce not the same object again, but a replica" (Flew 107). Peter Van Inwagen argues that this objection is even valid in regard to literal resurrection. He urges us to imagine a manuscript that was written by St. Augustine, burned by Arians in 457, and miraculously recreated by God in 458 (Van Inwagen 242). Van Inwagen contends:

The manuscript God creates... is not the manuscript that was destroyed, since the various atoms that compose the tracings of ink on its surface occupy their present positions not as a result of Augustine's activity but of God's (Van Inwagen 243).

He also uses the analogy of a house of blocks built by a child. If the mother accidentally knocks down the house and rebuilds it in the same configuration the blocks originally were in, the resulting house would not be the house of blocks built by the child, but by the mother (Van Inwagen 243).

John Hick would argue that whether or not the replica can be identified with the original person is a matter for decision, and I would agree. The "replica objection" tries to argue that someone's being me should be a fact that is independent of the existence of any other people. In other words, since the replica would not be me if I existed and had not died, there is no room for calling the replica me after the dissolution of my original body. This assumption, however, is invalid. Van Inwagen seems to be playing linguistic games when he argues that reconstituting the person from the same matter would be a replica. The manuscript God creates has the same causal history as St. Augustine's manuscript since they are materially continuous with each other, thus they are the same manuscript. That a replica is materially continuous with the original person indicates identity, but bodily continuity is not necessary for personal identity. If I have my car repaired, and every single part is gradually replaced, is the resulting car the same car? Indeed it is. If every single part was disassembled and at some later date the car was reassembled completely from different parts, but with the same exact material and quality and in the same exact configuration as the original, the resulting car would be the same car. It is the same car because it is the closest-continuer of the original. If the original exists and an exact replica is created, then the original would be the closest-continuer and the replica would not be the same car. That the original is destroyed does matter. If my body dies and a replica is created, there is room for calling it me; if my body lives and a replica is created, there is no room for calling it me. Thus the replica objection to resurrection is invalid.

Another problem for resurrection in any form is the age regression problem, which is stated by W. T. Stace:

When an old man dies, what kind of consciousness is supposed to survive? Is it his consciousness as it was just before death, which may perhaps have become imbecile? Or is it the consciousness of his mature middle age? Or is it the infant mind that he had when he was a baby? The point of these questions is not that we do not know the answers... The point is that all possible answers are equally senseless... will the old man who dies suddenly revert to his middle years after death? And will the infant who dies suddenly become mature? (Edwards 60).

This argument applies equally to disembodied minds and astral bodies. It shows that survival claims are not credible, not that they are meaningless (Edwards 60).

The conceptual problems for the three common vehicles for survival make survival a highly implausible possibility. Disembodied existence is inconceivable, astral bodies are too ill-defined or undefined to warrant their acceptance, and literal resurrection cannot account for the fact that many people who have shared the same matter cannot all be resurrected of that matter. There are no logical problems for the prospect of a resurrection replica, but, given our past experience, resurrection is an extremely unlikely prospect for the future.

Bibliography

Broad, C. D. "On Survival Without a Body." In Immortality . Edited Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1992: 276-78.

Edwards, Paul. "Introduction." In Immortality . Edited Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1992: 1-70.

Flew, Antony. God, Freedom, and Immortality: A Critical Analysis. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984.

Hospers, John. "Is the Notion of Disembodied Existence Intelligible?" In Immortality. Edited Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1992: 279-281.

Lamont, Corliss. The Illusion of Immortality. 5th ed. New York: Unger/Continuum, 1990.

Van Inwagen, Peter. "The Possibility of Resurrection." In Immortality. Edited Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1992: 242-46.

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